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TI - Cameroon's hidden harvest: commercial chainsaw logging, corruption, and livelihoods
AU - Cerutti, P.O.
AU - Tacconi, L.
AU - Lescuyer, G.
AU - Nasi, R.
AB - This article discusses the extent, impacts, and governance dynamics of illegal logging and associated corruption in the chainsaw milling sector in Cameroon and the implications for natural resource management theory and international initiatives, represented by the European Union's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. We show that state officials may be collecting some 46 million in informal payments each year, part of which is siphoned into a pyramidal system that manages careers not by merit, but by the price one can pay. We argue that corruption becomes a root cause of policy failures when disillusioned state officials perceive that those at the top of the pyramid do not have the legitimacy needed to promote reforms. Arbitrariness, mistrust, and contradiction then predominate, thus weakening the rule of law. We derive lessons for interventions addressing corruption and its impacts.
PY - 2013
UR - https://www.cifor-icraf.org/knowledge/publication/3911/
DO - https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2012.714846
KW - corruption, economy, illegal logging, livelihoods, political systems
ER -
Endnote (.ciw)
%T Cameroon's hidden harvest: commercial chainsaw logging, corruption, and livelihoods
%A Cerutti, P.O.
%A Tacconi, L.
%A Lescuyer, G.
%A Nasi, R.
%D 2013
%U https://www.cifor-icraf.org/knowledge/publication/3911/
%R https://doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2012.714846
%X This article discusses the extent, impacts, and governance dynamics of illegal logging and associated corruption in the chainsaw milling sector in Cameroon and the implications for natural resource management theory and international initiatives, represented by the European Union's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan. We show that state officials may be collecting some 46 million in informal payments each year, part of which is siphoned into a pyramidal system that manages careers not by merit, but by the price one can pay. We argue that corruption becomes a root cause of policy failures when disillusioned state officials perceive that those at the top of the pyramid do not have the legitimacy needed to promote reforms. Arbitrariness, mistrust, and contradiction then predominate, thus weakening the rule of law. We derive lessons for interventions addressing corruption and its impacts.
%K corruption
%K economy
%K illegal logging
%K livelihoods
%K political systems
Année de publication
2013
ISSN
0894-1920
Auteurs
Cerutti, P.O.; Tacconi, L.; Lescuyer, G.; Nasi, R.
Langue
English
Mots clés
corruption, economy, illegal logging, livelihoods, political systems
Source
Society and Natural Resources. 26(5): 539-553
Géographique
Cameroon








